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PROPOSITIONS

of the PhD Dissertation

*Antecedents and Preparation of the Standard Electric Trial,
1948–1950*

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Piliscsaba, Hungary

2012

I. Description of the dissertation's subject matter, presentation of the problem, research antecedents

1. Summary of the Standard Electric Case

The Standard Electric trial was one of the Rákosi era's major show trials however even historians barely know this case. I am confident that the trial deserves full scholarly attention and that its place is among the MAORT, Mindszenty and Rajk cases.

The designation "Standard Electric trial" stems from the name of Standard Electric Co. The defendants in the court process of February 1950 consisted of this enterprise's senior officers and their acquaintances. Standard Electric was a 100% American-owned firm that had operated in Budapest since 1928. Its factory manufactured telecommunications equipment mainly under International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) licences. After World War 2, following the communist takeover in Hungary the issue of the company's nationalization was raised in line with the general trend. However, negotiations began with representatives of the New York concern on Standard Budapest's future in 1948. A draft agreement was reached between the Hungarian government and ITT but it was never formally signed. By early November 1949 Imre Geiger, the general manager appointed by the Americans, could not bear the pressure by state authorities and communist agents inside the company any longer and decided on fleeing the country for fear of the agreement's failure. However, the State Protection Authority (ÁVH) watched every step of his, therefore his attempt failed, he was arrested before reaching the border. Robert Vogeler, the New York owner's representative in Central Europe shared the same fate when trying to leave the country by car legally some days later. The growing number of confessions resulted in newer and newer arrests. Three days after Vogeler's detention Edgar Sanders, a British citizen and the permanent Hungarian representative of the owner was also arrested by the ÁVH. Thus the trial's key figures were already in the ÁVH's hands (Zoltán Radó, head of department at the Ministry of Heavy Industry overseeing Standard Electric, had been arrested earlier).

There were of course diplomatic aspects to the American company's postwar history. The US Legation in Budapest repeatedly intervened because of Standard's hardships and discrimination against the company after 1945. The American diplomats and military bodies also showed close interest in the proposed agreement between ITT and the Hungarian government. However, the diplomatic side of the case became most prominent after the detention of the two foreigners. The British and

American legation frequently repeated their demand that the respective consuls could visit Sanders and Vogeler. As these requests were rejected, the US government closed down the Hungarian consulates in New York and Cleveland, while London broke off the ongoing trade negotiations with Budapest. Standard Electric itself did not provoke further diplomatic interventions for it was nationalized on 28 December 1949 together with firms employing more than 10 people and the remaining Western-owned companies.

The court hearings in the Standard Electric trial (officially entitled “the criminal case of Imre Geiger and co.”) took place between 17 and 21 February 1950. Geiger, Radó, Vogeler, Sanders and their three associates mutually and unanimously accused each other and themselves with espionage and sabotage. According to the testimonies, the defendants sabotaged the factory’s production in line with the interests of the United States, thus hindering economic development in Hungary and other “people’s democracies” using Standard Electric products. At the same time, these people allegedly served as members of the spy ring operated by the two high-ranking intelligence agents, Vogeler and Sanders. They provided economic and military data acquired through the firm to the US and British legation, which in turn forwarded these to the appropriate intelligence agencies (in Vienna, London and Washington). The court hearings were open to the press, so foreign media representatives could send first-hand reports on how Vogeler and Sanders testified against “the machinations of Anglo-American imperialists”. Geiger and Radó was sentenced to death, the American defendant received a 15-year sentence while Sanders got 13. The death penalties were carried out. There were also three other trials behind closed doors with the participation of those defendants who were deemed less significant, however these yielded no death sentences.

As a follow-up to the Standard Electric trial the Hungarian government, citing evidence “revealed” in court, declared personae non gratae and expelled a couple of diplomats at the US (3) and British (2) embassies identified by the defendants as their “higher contacts”. In Britain’s case Budapest also demanded that the local British Council office be closed. In consequence of these steps it was British–Hungarian relations that soured most for London implemented retaliatory measures. After the mutual expulsions the two countries were on the brink of breaking relations. With the situation somewhat improving, the negotiations focused on what concessions the Hungarian government could get in return for releasing Sanders. (The discussions with the US government had centred on the question of Vogeler’s release from the beginning.) The former Standard

employee's case was settled with Washington in April 1951, however with Britain the solution came in August 1953 only.

Nationalized (renamed as Beloiannisiz) and forcefully deprived of its best minds, the company could not count on Western licences any more either and produced poor results in the 1950s. The phenomena earlier labelled "sabotage" continued to exist, even strengthened in some cases. Review processes concerning most Standard Electric defendants started in 1954; police and judicial authorities still dealt with the case as late as the 1970s. It was in 1973 that the issue of Hungarian national debt to the United States from the nationalization of Standard Electric Co. (as well as the other American firms taken over by the state) was settled.

2. Significance of the case

In view of the above it is easier to explain the claim that the Standard Electric trial should be discussed among the most important cases of the era. The special significance of the case can be put down to a number of factors. Perhaps the most vital among these is that the trial featured an American and a British defendant, which was unprecedented in the whole Eastern Bloc, and remained unique even afterwards in the Stalin era.¹ The importance of that becomes obvious if one considers the difference in international prestige that existed between the two leading Western powers and Hungary. As far as the true value is concerned, it was hardly a tremendous success that an Englishman and an American gave evidence on the intelligence and sabotage activities of their governments and embassies in front of representatives of the international press. However, no communist country had gone even that far before.

It is also noteworthy that there were only four such cases during the Rákosi era the court transcripts of which were published in the form of a "white book": the Mindszenty, Rajk, a Grósz and Standard trials. It goes without saying that the party leadership provided such publicity to the cases that it regarded most important from its own viewpoint, and this is something that one should take into consideration today as well.

¹ There were three public trials east of the Iron Curtain between 1945 and 1953 in which the local authorities used foreign defendants: 1. the Robineau case in Poland in 1950 (French citizen); 2. the Standard Electric case; 3. the Oatis case in Czechoslovakia in 1951 (US citizen).

The significance of the company that lent its name to the case also gives weight to the Standard trial. No sensational show trial would have been held with the participation of a small enterprise's managers, even if it had been foreign-owned. That Standard Budapest was one of Europe's most important factories of telecommunications equipment and the subsidiary of the leading concern in the field of the day, ITT, were facts that explained why the developments reached such intensity. It is a highly interesting issue what the communist leadership's attitude was to this firm and what actually provoked the final showdown, knowing that Soviet technology lagged far behind the Western one in this segment. The literature in this respect is very incomplete anyway; one can read about developments concerning Western companies in Hungary only in connection with a few highlighted cases (egg. MAORT), that is why elaborating into a certain subtopic produces fundamental information in itself on economic policy between 1945 and 1949.

Furthermore, it is also of high importance that regarding the trial's antecedents as well as consequences, one can see a hugely complex sequence of events, which gives a unique opportunity to study the procedures – and deficiencies – of the activities of the Hungarian diplomacy, the economic and state security authorities and the party leadership in context. The subject, dating back to 1945 and having an impact up to the 1970s, provides a great opportunity to analyse what a profound effect the very same case had on both the country's economic and diplomatic situation.

The significance of the participating decision-makers also indicates the importance of a case. One can point out that the Standard Electric case was run by the top political leadership in every stage. When ÁVH took over, the elite of the Authority's "classic" period (Gábor Péter, Ernő Szűcs, Gyula Décsi, István Dékán, Ákos Pál, György Szöllősi, György Váradi, Dezső Radványi, Ervin Faludi) dealt with it. Mátyás Rákosi's active personal role can be traced throughout the economic, security as well as diplomatic phase.

Finally, the Standard case demands special attention due to the fact that the documentary material available for researchers is of large volume and almost full. Integrated with further sources, this material enables researchers to reveal so far unknown details concerning the operation, methods and institutional history of ÁVH.

3. Purpose of the dissertation

The so-called Standard case consists of three main parts: 1. antecedents and investigation up to the trial; 2. the trial itself and the validity of the charges; 3. diplomatic and further consequences, aftermath. Unfortunately, due to length limits, it is not feasible to present and analyse all three components in a thorough manner. Therefore, I decided to explore the most complex part, the antecedents and preparations of the trial.

I am convinced that this part is more important than the actual charges made in the trial. In fact, the charges listed in the indictment have nothing to do with the real antecedents of the case as they were compiled in accordance with the propaganda purposes of the trial – just like the list of defendants to take part in the main trial. The reason for holding the court process was not the crimes (no matter if they had been committed or not) but political motives – similarly to other procedures. What factors led to this political decision, when this was made and finally how the state security organs carried it their task – these are the real questions and the dissertation tries to answer these.² Keeping this objective in mind, I set up sub-objectives to explore the Standard case's various dimensions:

- the company's operation from the end of World War II to the nationalisation, focussing on reparation deliveries,
- the company's relations to government agencies, MKP/MDP and the Soviet Reparations Office in Hungary,
- intention of nationalisation and the process of negotiations, concentrating on the standpoints of the two sides, ITT and MDP,
- attitude of the American government organs towards the agreement,
- the role of top MDP executives in Standard-related decisions, especially Mátyás Rákosi,
- internal situation within Standard Electric, and Imre Geiger's position
- the activity of different Hungarian state security bodies in connection with the firm up to November 1949,
- the ÁVH-run investigation procedure, methods and participants, particularly the selection of the partakers in the main trial.

² No doubt, it is an exciting issue whether, for example, Vogeler was a spy or not, however, regarding the whole topic, it is only secondary.

4. The antecedents of the research

Considering the literature on the Standard case, one can declare that the issue was not in the foreground of historical research either before the change of regime or afterwards. First, it was Vera Pécsi who dealt with the topic in detail. Her efforts resulted in a manuscript, a research article and a documentary film. It was from her work that the public could learn of the Standard-trial. Mátyás Sárközi summed up the case-related information in his prologue to the facsimile edition of the trial's white paper published in Paris in 1989, however, the author could only rely on the sources published up to that time (mainly Vogeler's book) and the contemporary press. Since then, the case's diplomatic aspects have received attention – apart from three works connected to my research. There are two studies on the British diplomatic aspects (by Andrea Glavanovics and myself) and three about the American ones (by István Pál, János Honvári and Martin Mevius).

In order to reach the thesis objectives, I could mainly use Vera Pécsi's pieces of work. She already integrated original documents in her study and documentary film, producing a high quality summary of the case. I consider my dissertation as the continuation of her work.

II. Methodology

At the beginning of the research, it was crucial to explore the literature and archival material as well as the press. Due to the considerable lack of literature dealing with the case, the emphasis necessarily shifted to archival sources.

The main principle of archival research was to study all remaining documentary material of contemporary state organs that might have had any contact with Standard between 1945–1949 or had anything to do with the case. Therefore, I first gathered the titles of collections from archival catalogues that seemed even a bit relevant. Then, I systematically started to study them. I used this method to process the material at the Hungarian National Archives (MOL), State Security Archives (ÁBTL), Budapest Municipal Archives (BFL), Archives of Political History and Trade Unions (PIL), Military History Archives (HL) as well as the Oral History Archives of the 1956 Institute (OHA).

The core of the documentary material used consists of those 67 pieces of folders designated 'V-600' that contain the investigation material of the

Standard case. This is more than 15,000 pages including not only the investigation material but also a great number of factory, court and revision records. In addition, party documents (MKP, MDP, SZDP); documents from economic government bodies (Ministries of Industry and Heavy Industry, Reparations Office, State Control Centre); records of the Standard Electric Co.; British- and American-related documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, files from the ÁVO/ÁVH and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (related cases and revisions); documents from the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as some oral history interviews.

Thanks to the Hungarian Fulbright Committee, I had the opportunity to conduct archival research in the United States in 2008–2009. From the rich collection of the US National Archives I used the documents of the State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff in my dissertation.

Besides, the published memoirs by the participants or people concerned such as Robert Vogeler, László Kozma, Vladimír Farkas and Mátyás Rákosi also provided useful important sources. Similarly, newspapers such as *Szabad Nép*, *The Times* and *Daily Herald* also proved essential.

III. The new results of the dissertation

The new results of my dissertation can be summed up in the following propositions:

1. The operation of Standard Co. 1945–1949 and the reparation deliveries
 - until 1949, the company had steadily suffered from raw material of inappropriate quality, and it repeatedly turned to its supervising bodies for help;
 - The Reparations Office fixed the prices for the company in a disadvantageous way, furthermore, it often paid late because the already nationalised firms had a payment priority;
 - the difficulties in raw materials and financial resources affected the company seriously because the complicated telephone exchanges required a production program that was pre-calculated months before and relied on a fragile balance, which made it especially sensitive to any changes.

2. Negotiations about Standard's future

- antecedent: the preparation of the Telecom Plan that aimed at renewing and running the Hungarian telecommunications network by ITT was first hindered because of the Soviet army's objections. Later, after Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy had been forced to resign – the American side backtracked.
- the issue of nationalising Standard Co. was first raised on 26th February 1948 in MKP documents. On 12th May 1948 Ernő Gerő decided that the criterion for further credit transfer for Standard should be handing over 51% of shares to the Hungarian state. The United States protested against the ultimatum formally, too;
- during the first discussions, the basis for negotiation changed soon: the Hungarian government agreed on ITT's holding 100% of Standard shares in return for giving the technology licenses. This was unique not only in Hungary but the whole Eastern Bloc as well;
- both Gerő and Rákosi approved of the draft contract of 30th May 1949, Rákosi even made some modifications in it;
- the Hungarian Institute of Military Technology exerted an impact on compiling the list of licenses. There are no signs of Soviet influence, however, the special nature of the agreement indicates that the Hungarian party leadership had Moscow approved of the draft, too;
- ITT submitted the draft agreement to the American government for opinion, JCS had the final word. In a long process taking several months, JCS's intelligence committee finally declined the draft due to Air Force Intelligence Chief Charles P. Cabell's resistance. In Cabell's reasoning, the agreement would have increased the Soviet Military Bloc's potential. The State Department agreed with JCS's opinion, however, ITT chairman Sosthenes Behn strongly disputed that;
- the competent Hungarian government and party bodies eagerly awaited the American approval of the contract and there are documents proving that they really intended to comply with the stipulations of the agreement, at least until it became obvious what the practical use of the agreement would be;

- the Ministry of Heavy Industry led by Imre Karczag became more and more impatient because of the delay to which the experience of the Rajk trial contributed, too: now no one could afford any more to have the suspicion of compromising with the Americans. Standard's leadership was responsible for the delay, but Zoltán Radó was also regarded suspicious. On 11th October 1949 Karczag already urged that the case be rolled up by the police authorities;
- in the factory, a parallel structure of reliable communists emerged gradually to control Geiger's and his confidants' activities;
- Geiger already felt the party's distrust towards himself and started to consider the idea of defection seriously. He decided to do so by October 1949 when there was still no news about the contract.

3. State security organs and Standard Electric, 1946–1949

The investigation and examination that led to the trial were run by the ÁVO/ÁVH but other state security organs also carried out work in connection with Standard:

- Military Policy Department, Ministry of Defence (Katpol): based on the documents, it is probable that they conducted operations against Edgar Sanders;
- Economic Police Department (GRÜ): until 1948, undertook investigation against the remaining supporters of the factory's wartime management. In September 1948 they arrested three Standard clerks with charges of corruption related to the Hungarian Post Office – most probably in hope of influencing the negotiations regarding the factory's future. In spring 1949 they were released without filing charges (in the meanwhile, GRÜ was disbanded)
- Control Department, Ministry of Heavy Industry: investigated Standard leaders' activities using intelligence methods. Most of the reports were written in a malevolent way and probably influenced by the informants' personal interests as well.

ÁVO/ÁVH activity:

- the Rajk division: Zoltán Radó was put into custody independently from the Standard case in connection with the Rajk trial's British group, prior to all Standard suspects;
- Industry (Countersabotage) Section: investigated Standard since 1946. Up to autumn 1949, the case belonged exclusively to this section – practically one person, the detective responsible for the telecommunications industry. Until 1949, the work was carried out at low intensity and quality. The factory agent network was built up gradually, which could primarily rely on the factory's Communist party organization. The former chairman of the Workers' Committee of Standard, who sympathised with the Social Democratic Party, was forced to resign. Journalist Aurél Ábrányi was planted in Geiger's surroundings and reported, among others, on the general manager's defection plans. The reports of Györgyné Zádor, secretary of ISEC's Budapest office who voluntarily offered her services to the authorities and was a secret member of the communist party, were used but the ÁVH did not trust her;
- Counterintelligence Section: the counterintelligence officers had worked against Edgar Sanders (and his co-defendant to-be, István Justh, the provost of Felsőörs) through the recruitment of Károly Vas, head ('főispán') of Veszprém county, before the full investigation started in the Standard case. Standard Electric caught the section's attention because of Vogeler in the autumn of 1949. From that time on, the two sections worked on the case jointly but their cooperation was not without difficulties;
- it was only after Geiger and Vogeler had attempted to flee the country that the party leadership ordered the ÁVH to roll up the case. The reason behind that was clearly the hope that the agreement would be signed by the Americans.
- Vogeler contacted an Austro-Hungarian human trafficking network to help Geiger and his family defect. However, the operation, taking place on 10 November 1949, failed due to close ÁVH surveillance; the defectors were arrested. Upon Geiger's confessions Vogeler and Sanders were soon detained, too; senior Standard personnel were seized one by one.

4. The examination

- the trial was made special by the two foreign defendants; without them the Standard case would have been but a re-enactment of the MAORT case. However, the final decision on sending Vogeler and Sanders on stage in the court process was made only after the ÁVH had compiled a sensational enough set of charges. The decision was made by Mátyás Rákosi, who weighed the expected diplomatic, economic and political effects. There had been no public show trial in the Eastern Bloc before the Standard case that had featured an American or a British subject; here the two went to court together at once;

- the examination can be divided into three roughly one-month sections:

1. 18 November – 15 December 1949 (clarification of basic questions)

2. 15 December 1949 – 16 January 1950 (taking records of evidence suitable for the trial)

3. 16 January – 17 February 1950 (detailed preparation of the trial, synchronisation of the testimonies);

- Zoltán Radó's status changed several times during the examination. At times the ÁVH intended to use him in the British group of the Rajk case, other times he was listed among the participants of the Standard trial. Eventually the latter option was chosen, with Radó receiving the role of the "Trotskyist enemy within the party";

- apart from Geiger and the two foreigners, the list of people to take part in the Standard trial was open until the very last moments. Each defendant represented a different category of the enemy;

- Béla Sulyok, János Vörös and Béla Scitovszky's name also surfaced during the examination but they were left out of the trial for various reasons. Israel G. Jacobson was questioned concerning Vogeler, nevertheless the ÁVH eventually did not connect their cases;

- physical methods applied by the ÁVH during the examination of the Standard case included: physical abuse (on a relatively few occasions; on Hungarian victims only), deprivation of sleep, exhaustion, hardly bearable circumstances in cell;

- psychical methods: various dire threats of maltreatment (relating to the detainee himself and his loved ones), blackmail with publication of intimate information, making completely unreal charges (e.g. murder),

threats of extradition to the USSR or Czechoslovakia (in the case of Sanders and Vogeler, respectively), promise of light sentence in case of cooperation, setting detainees against one another, cajoling by cell informants, “meaningful” meetings with ÁVH leaders;

- in the records of evidence the examiners distorted the detainees’ oral testimonies and made them sign the records in the distorted form. The officers constantly demanded newer and newer pieces of damning evidence of the detainees, therefore they often made something up just to be able to confess something new;

- at the beginning the examination was led by István Dékán, head of the Counterintelligence Section, then the trial’s preparations were already orchestrated by Gyula Décsi. Ernő Szűcs and Ákos Pál also held important roles in the investigation;

- Soviet examining officer advisors, led by Lieutenant Colonel Polyakov, took part in the process all the way through. Apart from providing methodological advice regarding the detainees, the advisors also conducted some interrogations themselves. Generally they expected a tougher stand, an unrelenting fight against Trotskyism of their Hungarian colleagues and proposed a highly extended number of arrests in the Standard case, which was however rejected by the Hungarian side;

- ÁVH was transformed into an independent administrative authority during the examination, the organizational changes also included the formation of a new Department of Examination. In consequence, several new examining officers were assigned to the case in January 1950 who had no experience in the field;

- the confusion characteristic of the Rajk trial’s preparations eased considerably. On Soviet instructions, the examination process now included planned elements (e.g. investigation plans).

5. Mátyás Rákosi and the Standard Electric case

- Rákosi played a dominant role during the examination process. He was regularly updated on the developments of the case, read the testimonies taken by the ÁVH, inquiring even about subtle details in the records. He personally decided that the trial should be open to the public;

- Vogeler’s detention (18 November 1949) took place during the Kominform meeting in Galyatető, Hungary (16–20 November). Most

probably the promise of prestige brought by the arrest of an “American spy” was a relevant factor for Rákosi, who was engaged in a constant prestige rivalry with other communist leaders, to give the go ahead to an action with such far-reaching diplomatic consequences;

- when handing over the testimonies relating to Czechoslovakia taken during the examination, Rákosi again concentrated on building his own prestige: he did not miss the opportunity to bring the matter to the Soviet authorities’ attention;

- Rákosi pre-planned the retaliatory measures (expulsion of British and American diplomats) to be implemented in response to the evidence “revealed” in the trial, even informing Moscow several days before the sentences were pronounced;

- the party chairman discussed the Standard case in detail during his meeting with US minister Nathaniel Davis and in a number of his speeches (before the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party, MDP and on his trip in county Zala). These communications are characterised by greater-than-ever efforts by Rákosi to emphasise his central role as well as a vision of an anti-US, anti-Britain showdown that in fact far exceeded Hungary’s real power and potential. From that one can draw the consequence that for some reason Rákosi regarded the Standard case a special affair of personal importance;

- several factors indicate that it was not Moscow that gave the order to hold the trial (e.g. in that case the Hungarians would not have waited until the last moment to arrest Vogeler, the topic was rarely mentioned in the Stalin–Rákosi correspondence etc). It is certain, however, that Rákosi had to seek Stalin’s permission;

- the real reasons behind holding the trial:

1. Such a highly intense confrontation with the West must have had an especially important motive, for the “achievements” of the trial (expulsions, conditions in return for releasing the foreigners) could have been secured with much less hubbub.

2. Even if the Standard case had domestic political messages, these were not the primary ones. The first political priority of the day in domestic affairs was to eradicate the remnants of the Rajk case. Chronologically the Standard Electric trial is wedged in among a row of Rajk side-trials. This shows that the Standard trial must have been provoked by some extraordinary situation that emerged.

3. The assumption that the Standard trial in the form it was held was needed in order to justify the firm's nationalization or to evade the American compensation claims seems incorrect. Nationalization was not such a key topic in 1950 any more, furthermore there is documentary evidence that the party leadership was aware of the payment obligation;

4. Summing up the above research findings it seems most probable that Rákosi's special attitude to the Standard Electric case was rooted in the failed ISEC draft agreement that he personally approved and even modified somewhat. Rákosi found himself in an untenable situation for he had consented to a deal that was unique behind the Iron Curtain, what is more, he definitely secured Moscow's permission, that is opened up to the leading "imperialist" power – which in turn tricked him. To Rákosi, who constantly tried to win Stalin's trust and surpass the leaders of other people's democracies, such a great lack of vigilance against the US was unaffordable, especially after the Rajk case. Rákosi chose the "best defence is a good offence" principle. By publicly humiliating an American and a British defendant as well as pillorising Anglo-American imperialism he organised an unprecedented trial, the "immense" significance of which he tried to prove far and wide. Even though he overstepped the mark by trying to put the US and Britain in the same league as Hungary, he needed to erase the memory of the failure. The trial and its organiser achieved their goal, what is more, Rákosi turned the disadvantage into an advantage. From that time on he could regard himself not only the champion of the fight against Titoism, but he could also take on the role of the punisher of Anglo-American imperialism. The Standard Electric Co. itself played only a secondary role in the trial for the main objective was not related to the firm. That is why I am convinced that the Standard case does not belong among the so called "economic trials" of the era, because it was only formally, thematically "economic" but not in its goal. Standard Electric served only as a carrier of the trial's message.

IV. Published works

1. Research articles

A brit–magyar diplomáciai kapcsolatok és a Sanders-ügy, 1949–1953. [British-Hungarian Diplomatic Relations and the Sanders Case, 1949–1953] *Valóság*, 2006/6. pp. 74–92.

Nagy-Britannia részvétele a koreai háborúban. [British Participation in the Korean War] *Világtörténet*, Fall–Winter 2008. pp. 45–58.

Adalékok az angol katonai hírszerzés történetéhez Edgar Sanders ügyének tükrében. [Contributions to the History of British Military Intelligence in the Mirror of Edgar Sanders' Case] *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 2009/3. pp. 731–743.

Vázlat Edgar Sanders tevékenységéhez és a Standard-perben betöltött szerepének értékeléséhez. [An Outline for Evaluating Edgar Sanders' Activities and Role in the Standard Case] In J. Újváry Zsuzsanna (szerk.): *Összekötnek az évezredek*. PPKE BTK–Szent István Társulat, 2011. pp. 294–309.

Áldozat: a magyar telefonipar. Kozma László a Standard-ügyben, 1949–1950 (1954). [Victim: the Hungarian Telephone Industry. László Kozma in the Standard Case, 1949–1950 (1954)] In M. Kiss–Ifj. Bertényi–Fejérdy (szerk.): *A mában élő tegnapok. Tanulmányok a XIX. és XX. század történetéhez*. *Khronosz* 2. PPKE BTK, Piliscsaba, 2011. pp. 221–256.

2. Conference Paper:

British-Hungarian Diplomatic Relations and the Sanders Case, 1949–1953. *East-Central Europe in the Cold War, 1945-1989*. Organiser: Cold War International History Project–Polish Institute of National Remembrance. Warsaw, 16–18 October 2008.